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Introduction
An important aspect of the positive theory of international trade is to explain the volume of trade between countries and its determinants. The 'new trade theory' explains intra-industry trade using monopolistic competition and oligopoly models that stress the role of imperfect competition, economies of scale and product differentiation. Conventional wisdom suggests that the volume of intra-industry trade is increasing in the degree of product differentiation, and this view is supported by the results of Bernhofen (2001) . This paper will re-examine how product differentiation affects the volume of trade under oligopoly.
The most widely used measure of intra-industry trade is the Grubel-Lloyd index [see Grubel and Lloyd (1975) ] that measures the proportion of international trade in an industry that is intra-industry trade. This has been extensively used in empirical work to demonstrate the extent of intra-industry trade, and to explain inter-industry variations in intra-industry trade in terms of variables such as scale economies, product differentiation, and market structure. 1 Generally, the econometric results suggest that product differentiation and scale economies have a positive effect on intra-industry trade as measured by the Grubel-Lloyd index or similar indices. However, this is not consistent with the theory since Ethier (1982) , using a monopolistic competition model, showed that the Grubel-Lloyd index is invariant to changes in the degree of product differentiation and the extent of scale economies. For this reason, Harrigan (1994) argued that the implications of the monopolistic competition model should be tested by looking at the volume of trade rather than the Grubel-Lloyd index. He looked at the contribution of scale economies to the volume of trade and found some evidence that the volume of trade was higher in industries with large economies of scale.
1 See Greenaway and Milner (1986) for a detailed explanation of the Grubel-Lloyd index and a survey of early empirical work on inter-industry variations in intra-industry trade.
2 Schmitt and Yu (2001) provide a theoretical explanation for this result in a monopolistic competition model with traded and non-traded goods. Therefore, when looking at the effect of product differentiation on intra-industry trade, it seems prudent to analyse the effect on the volume of intra-industry trade rather than the effect on the Grubel-Lloyd index.
2 Bernhofen (2001) analysed the effect of product differentiation on the volume of trade in a symmetric oligopoly model using Bowley demand functions and assuming that the trade cost is zero. He showed that the volume of trade (in terms of quantities and values) was increasing in the degree of product differentiation under Cournot oligopoly and under Bertrand oligopoly. This paper will re-examine how product differentiation affects the volume of trade under duopoly using Shubik-Levitan demand functions rather than the Bowley demand functions used by Bernhofen (2001) , and assuming that the trade cost is positive rather than zero. The Shubik-Levitan demand functions have the advantage that an increase in product differentiation does not increase the size of the market as happens with the Bowley demand functions. Without this market expansion effect from product differentiation, it is shown that the volume of trade in terms of quantities is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is relatively low, but increasing in the degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is relatively high. When the trade cost is zero, the volume of trade in terms of values is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation if the marginal cost of the firms is sufficiently high. An alternative measure of the volume of trade is the market share of imports and this is increasing in the degree of product differentiation if the trade cost is positive with both Shubik-Levitan and Bowley demand functions. Qualitatively similar results are obtained under both Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, although it is shown that the volume of trade is higher under Bertrand duopoly than under Cournot duopoly except when the trade cost is relatively high. Also, the paper extends the analysis of Anderson, Donsimoni and Gabszewicz (1989) and Bernhofen (2001) 
The Volume of Trade under Cournot Duopoly
The model is similar to the symmetric two-country model considered by Bernhofen Rather than using the Bowley specification of demand functions employed by Bernhofen (2001) , the demand functions will be assumed to be the Shubik-Levitan specification of demand functions, although expressed in a manner that makes it easier to compare them with the Bowley demand functions. Preferences in country A can be represented by a quadratic quasi-linear utility function:
where z is a numeraire good produced by a competitive industry using constant returns to scale technology. Utility maximisation yields the linear inverse demands facing the two oligopolistic firms in country A:
The parameter  is the maximum willingness to pay of the consumers,  is inversely related to the size of the market, and  is the degree of product substitutability that ranges from 0   when the products are independent to 1   when the products are perfect substitutes. Since the model is symmetric, demand functions are the same for country B, but with a subscript B rather than a subscript A.
An increase in the degree of product differentiation does not affect the total size of the market with Shubik-Levitan demand functions, whereas an increase in product differentiation increases the size of the market with Bowley demand functions. With Shubik-Levitan demand functions, if the price of both products is 1
, which is independent of the degree of product substitutability,  .
With Bowley demand functions, where the inverse demand facing firm one in country A is:
and the demand facing firm two in country A is: 
, which is decreasing in the degree of product substitutability so an increase in product differentiation increases the size of the market.
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Under free trade, in country A, the profits of the domestic firm (firm one) are
, and the profits of the foreign firm (firm two) are
Using the demand functions in (2), it is straightforward to solve for the Cournot equilibrium outputs of the two firms in the two countries:
There will be no trade between the two countries if the trade cost is higher than:
where k is the prohibitive trade cost. Clearly, the prohibitive trade cost is decreasing 6 in the degree of product substitutability so intra-industry trade is more likely to occur the higher is the degree of product differentiation.
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Substituting (3) into (2) 
The total volume of intra-industry trade between the two countries measured in terms of physical quantities is given by:
Assuming that the trade cost is below the prohibitive level, k k  , the effect of a change in the degree of product substitutability on the volume of trade can be seen by differentiating C Q V with respect to  using (3), which yields:
This is positive (negative) if the relative trade cost is less (greater) than the critical
, which is shown in figure one as a function of the degree of product substitutability,  . Therefore, in contrast to Bernhofen (2001) , the volume of trade decreases with the degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is 7 sufficiently low (in the region below the critical trade cost in figure one). The explanation is that an increase in product differentiation lessens competition between the two firms with the result that both firms reduce output thereby reducing the volume of trade. Whereas, in Bernhofen (2001) , the effect of lessening competition was outweighed by the increase in market size due to the increase in product differentiation with the result that the outputs of both firms increased. When the trade cost is sufficiently high (in the region above the critical trade cost in figure one), the protective effect of the trade cost afforded to the domestic firm is reduced by an increase in product differentiation with the result that the output of the foreign firm increases thereby increasing the volume of trade.
Alternatively, the volume of trade could also be measured in terms of value rather than physical quantities, which is given by:
For simplicity, as in
Bernhofen (2001) V with respect to  using (3) and (4), which yields: the marginal cost is sufficiently high then the proportional change in the price will be small and the quantity effect will outweigh the price effect.
A different measure of the extent of international trade that takes account of market size is import penetration or the market share of imports, which measures the volume of trade relative to the size of the market. The market share of imports in terms of physical quantities is given by imports as a proportion of total consumption:
To see how the market share of imports depends upon the degree of product substitutability, differentiate (7) with respect to  using (3), which yields:
The market share of imports is always decreasing in the degree of product substitutability if the trade cost is positive so it is increasing in the degree of product differentiation. When the trade cost is zero, the market share of imports is one-half regardless of the degree of product substitutability. It can be shown that the market share of imports is the same with Bowley demand functions as with Shubik-Levitan demand functions.
Therefore, the market share of imports provides a robust measure that does not depend upon the specification of demand.
These results are summarised in the following proposition: 
The Volume of Trade under Bertrand Duopoly
As concern is often expressed about the robustness of results in models of trade under oligopoly, and to allow a comparison between Cournot duopoly and Bertrand duopoly, this section will analyse trade volume under Bertrand duopoly rather than Cournot duopoly with Shubik-Levitan demand functions. The results of Bernhofen (2001) Inverting the indirect demand functions in (2) yields the direct demand functions in country A facing firm one and firm two:
Following Clarke and Collie (2003) 
Substituting these prices into the direct demand functions (9) ( 2 ) for 0
The domestic firm in each country can set the monopoly price if the trade cost k k  , but there will be no imports if the trade cost k k  . For k k k   , there are no imports but the presence of the foreign firm has a pro-competitive effect on the price set by the domestic firm. The prohibitive trade cost, k , is decreasing in the degree of product substitutability so, as in the case of Cournot duopoly, intra-industry trade is more likely to occur the higher is the degree of product differentiation.
As in the case of Cournot duopoly, the volume of intra-industry trade measured in terms of physical quantities is given by: V with respect to  using (11), which yields:
, which is shown in figure two as a function of the degree of product substitutability,  . Therefore, in contrast to Bernhofen (2001) , the volume of trade decreases with the degree of product differentiation when the trade cost is sufficiently low (in the region below the critical trade cost in figure two) .
Bernhofen (2001), consider only the case when the trade cost is zero. Then, to see how the volume of trade in terms of value varies with the degree of product substitutability,
V with respect to  using (10) and (11), which yields:
This will be positive (negative) if the marginal cost is greater (lower) than the critical
, a sufficient condition for the derivative (13) to be positive for all values of the degree of product substitutability is that 2 c   . Then, in contrast to Bernhofen (2001) , the volume of intra-industry trade in terms of value is decreasing in the degree of product differentiation.
The market share of imports in terms of physical quantities under Bertrand duopoly, when k k  , is given by:
When k k  , imports are zero under Bertrand duopoly so the market share of imports is zero.
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To see how the market share of imports depends upon the degree of product substitutability, differentiate (7) with respect to  using (3) yields:
The market share of imports is always decreasing in the degree of product substitutability if the trade cost is positive so it is increasing in the degree of product differentiation.
These results are summarised in the following proposition: Subtracting the market share of imports under Bertrand duopoly (14) from the market share of imports under Cournot duopoly (7), when k k  , yields: 
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The Bertrand duopoly model yields qualitatively similar results to the Cournot duopoly model, although there are quantitative differences as spelled out in Proposition 3, so the results can be considered to be fairly robust.
Trade Liberalisation and Profits
Another issue addressed by Bernhofen (2001) 
